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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK M. WELLS, Assignee,
Statutory Assignment for the
Benefit of Creditors of Financial
Service Company, Inc.,
Plaintiffs,

v.
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah corporation; and FIRST
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, a National Association,
Defendants and Appellant,
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah banking corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 15750

v.
GOLDEN STETTLER, an individual,
LYNN TOOLSON, an individual,
ALMA DITTMER, an individual,
H. M. NIELSON, an individual,
and ELMER GIBSON, an individual,
Third-Party Defendants and
Respondents.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by Frank M. Wells, Assignee,
Statutory Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors of Financial
Service Company, Inc., claiming damages in exc;.:_~3- of -~9?,__9.0_Q_~OO
against Walker Bank & Trust Company, the appellant herein, and
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another bank, upon which claim appellant asserts that if there
--~-

--

be any damage to the plaintiff below for which appellant may
be responsible then the third party defendants, being the
former trustees of the Cache Valley Syndicate Trust (CVST),
and the respondents herein (CVST being the successor to Financial Service Company, Inc.), are responsible to appellant
based upon the alleged wrongdoing of an employee of the
respondents done in the course of his employment and the
alleged negligence of respondents in hiring, retaining and
supervising that employee.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court, the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, Judge,
sitting under designation of the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson, granted a motion to dismiss submitted by respondents

------------

-

dismissing the Third-Party Complaint of appellant against
--------··--

respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the Order of
the lower court dismissing appellant's Third-Party Complaint
and remand the case for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action, being one on which a third party complaint
has been filed, relies upon the alle~ations of the plaintiff
below as well as the respondent herein.

The alle_gat~o_i:_s_

ofthe-phl~tiff below in his Complaint are accepted as true
-2-

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for the purposes of this appeal even though they will be contested at time of trial.

Those allegations of the Complaint

were incorporated by reference into the Third-Party Complaint

and, thereby, add to the factual basis of this appeal.
Frank M. Wells, the plaintiff below, is the statutory
assignee for the benefit of creditors for Financial Service
Company, Inc., a defunct Utah corporation, and its common
law assignee for the benefit '?_f__ creditors_, Cache Valley Syndicate Trust, hereinafter referred to as "CVST".

(R. l)

Plaintiff brought an action against Walker Bank & Trust Cornpany, the appellant herein, and First Security Bank of Utah (R.l)
based upon various allegations that those banks had been gross.·~·----·----~~------·-

---------

ly negligent or merely negligent and dealt with various checks
.

·-

.

...

.

-·-

with knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duties or not in good
~----,,.~----~--~

faith.

(R.2)

""'··---

-~-

The specific factual allegations upon which

plaintiff bases his action against appellant and First Security Bank are:
(1)

that appellant paid out over

chec~s ()~ __91ST___n~;t

drawn on appellant which bore unauthorized alterations of the name of the payee or the amount of
the checks, or both (R.2,
(2)

4)~

that appellant converted or allowed Elmer G. Erickson to convert proceeds of some checks of CVST__ z::ot
drawn on appellant despite a special deposi~ ~~re
of those checks

(R.3);

-3-
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(3)

that appellant paid out on various checks payable
to CVST without adequate execution of the checks
(R.3);

(4)

that appellant paid out on checks payable to CVST
bearing unauthorized endorsements.

(R.4);

During that period of time that the allegations referred
to above were supposed to be occurring Financial Service
Company, Inc., was being operated as Cache Valley Syndicate
Trust (R.l) which was being managed and directed by Golden

--

Stettler, Lynn Toolson, Alma Dittmer, H. M. Nielson, and
Elmer Gibson, the respondents herein, acting as trustees of
CVST.

(R.43)

Elmer G. Erickson was employed as an agent or

servant of respondents to help respondents in their management of the trust.

(R.45)

While so employed and in the scope

of his employment, Elmer G. Erickson perpetrated those acts
referred to above of making unauthorized alterations to checks,
conversion of special deposits, submitting checks for payment
without adequate execution, and submitting for payment checks
be'a-r:lng unauthorized endorsements which endorsements were
made by said Elmer G. Erickson.

(R.45)

While Elmer G. Erickson was employed by respondents,
respondents knew or should have known that Elmer G. Erickson
had been doing those wrongful actions with the checks and
accounts of CVST as referred to above, yet respondents hired
and continued to employ Mr. Erickson.

(R.46)

Respondents

also failed to adequately supervise and care for Elmer G.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Erickson while he was in the employ of respondents while at
the same time placing Mr. Erickson in a position that required
his supervision as he aided the management of CVST.

(R.l, 46)

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
ALL ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANT WALKER BANK
ARE TO BE VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO IT.
POINT II
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM AGAINST RESPONDENTS UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON A RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY.
POINT III
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE ALLEGATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENTLY HIRED
AND RETAINED AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE ACTIONS MAY
BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO WALKER BANK.
POINT IV
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE ALLEGATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE ACTIONS MAY
BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO WALKER BANK.

-5-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANT WALKER
BANK ARE TO BE VIEWED IN A LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO IT.
The standard to be applied in reviewing the sufficiency
of any attempt to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted has been clearly stated by this Court and others.
The matters alleged by the party to whom a motion to dismiss
under 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
lodged are entitled to be viewed and considered by the court
with all the inferences fairly arising therefrom in a light
most favorable to that party.

This Court has previously

stated in Young v. Texas Company, 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d
1099 (1958), that in reviewing the granting of a motion for
sununary judgment
• the party against whom the judgment
has been granted is entitled to have all
the facts presented and all the inferences
fairly arising therefrom considered in a
light most favorable to him. Id. at 1100.

?-

See also, Foster v. Steed, 19 Utah 2d 435, 432 P.2d 60 (1967).
The same rule is applied to Rule 12(b) (6) motions to dismiss.
In reviewing a case involving a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss
this Court wrote:
A complaint does not fail to state a
claim unless it appears to a certainty
that the plaintiff would be entitled to
no relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of the claim.
Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Trans.
Service, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d
605, 607 (1970).
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To this standard the pleading of appellant must be compared.
Under the criterion as established by this Court all
the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint of appellant
are to be deemed true and are to be read in a light most
favorable to appellant.

Consequently, those facts as stated

in the Statement of Facts herein, being merely a rescitation
of the allegations of the Third-Party Complaint which incorporated by reference the allegations of the Complaint are
to be accepted as true by this Court and given all inferences favorable to the position of appellant herein.
POINT II
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM AGAINST
RESPONDENTS UPON WHICH RELIEF MAY BE
GRANTED BASED UPON A RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY.
Appellant has alleged in its Third-Party Complaint that
whatever loss that may have been sustained by Frank M. Wells,
Trustee, the plaintiff below, for which appellant may be
legally responsible to plaintiff, was a result of the tortious actions of one Elmer G. Erickson, namely, the forging
of endorsements, altering of instruments and passing on of
instruments known to be incompletely executed.

All such

actions of Elmer G. Erickson causing such damage were
alleged by appellant to have been done in the scope and
course of the employment of Elmer G. Erickson as an agent
or servant of respondents while respondents were trustees
of Cache Valley Syndicate Trust.

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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The doctrine of respondeat superior has long recognized that the employer is vicariously liable, notwithstanding complete lack of fault on his part, for the tortious conduct of his employees done in the course of the
employee's employment.

Under such circumstances the employer

is liable for the wrong of the employee just as if the
employer was the actual wrongdoer.

The general rule is

succinctly set forth in Prosser, Torts, §70 (4th ed. 1971),
where it reads:
Once it is determined that the man at
work is a servant, the master becomes
subject to vicarious liability for his
torts.

* * * *

his vicarious liability, for conduct which is in no way his own, extends
to any and all tortious conduct of the
servant which is within the "scope of the
employment."
The phrase "scope of the employment" is sometimes substituted with the phrase "course of the employment.''

Id.

The Restatement, Second, Agency, §219, reinforces the
position of Professor Prosser noted above when it states:
(1) A master is subject to liability for
the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment.
The general authorities are clear as to the standard to be
applied, the application of which to the fact situation now
before this Court would dictate the conclusion that appellant
had stated in its Third-Party Complaint a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
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Appellant had alleged that all of respondents are
trustees of the Cache Valley Syndicate Trust and had employed Elmer G. Erickson, the alleged tortfeasor, to help
conduct the affairs of their managing the trust.

It has

been uniformly determined that:
[a] trustee is liable for the tortious
acts of an agent or servant performed
during the course of his employment.
Bogert, Trusts, §129, (5th ed. 1973).
See also, Curtis v. Title
612, 40 P.2d 562

Guaran~eTrust

(Ct. App. Cal. 1935).

Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d
The drafters of

the Restatement, Second, Trusts, §264 provided in Comment b.
that:
Under the principle of respondeat superior,
torts committed by the agents or servants
of the trustee in the course of the administration of the trust subject the trustee
to liability to the same extent as though
he were not a trustee. The principle of
respondeat superior is applicable although
the trustee receives no benefit from the
trust.
Appellant is herein petitioning this Court to reverse
the decision of the lower court and remand the action for
trial giving appellant the opportunity to prove the facts
and legal relationships as alleged.

The granting of the

motion to dismiss, we respectfully suggest, was in error.
That which was pleaded stated a claim for which relief may
be granted based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior,
a generally recognized theory upon which liability may be
grounded.
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POINT III
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE ALLEGATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS NEGLIGENTLY HIRED
AND RETAINED AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE ACTIONS MAY
BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO WALKER BANK.
Appellant has alleged in its Third-Party Complaint
that respondents negligently hired Elmer G. Erickson when
respondents knew or should have known that Elmer G. Erickson
had been mishandling the affairs of Cache Valley Syndicate
Trust.

The respondents also continued to retain Elmer G.

Erickson as an employee with that knowledge or charge of
knowledge.

While in the employment of respondents, Elmer G.

Erickson committed various torts that damaged the plaintiff
below.

Plaintiff below looks to appellant in satisfaction

of some of those damages.

Appellant asserts under the

circumstances of this case that if it is responsible to the
plaintiff below that respondents are responsible to it
because of their negligence.
The Restatement, Second, Agency §213 addresses the
theory purported by your appellant when it says:
A person conducting an activity through
servants or other agents is subject to
liability for harm resulting from his
conduct if he is negligent or reckless:

* * * *

(b)
in the employment of improper
persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others; or
(d)
in permitting, or failing to
prevent, negligent or other torti~us conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with
instrumentalities under his control.
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The official comment of those who drafted the Restatement
is equally instructive.

Restatement, Second, Agency, §213,

Comment d. reads:
The principal may be negligent because
he has reason to know that the servant
or other agent, because of his qualities,
is likely to harm others in view of the
work or instrumentalities entrusted to
him.
Therefore, it is prudent to pick one's agents wisely.
The claims of negligently hiring and retaining an
employee do not rely upon any vicarious liability but rely
on the liability that comes to a wrongdoer for his own
actions or lack of action.

The authorities are clear that

an employer may be held liable for damages caused by the
tortious activities of its employees, even though not in
furtherance of the employer's business, if the employer was
negligent in employing or retaining the employee who committed the tort.

Reinforcing that which has been stated

herein, the authors of 57 C.J.S., Master and Servant §559,
have written:
A master may be liable for injuries inflicted on a third person by his servant
where he was guilty of negligence in selecting a servant incompetent or otherwise unfit to perform the services for
which he was employed • • •
Retaining in employment a servant who
is, or should be, known to be incompetent,
habitually negligent, or otherwise unfit,
is such negligence on the part of the
master as will render him liable for injuries to third persons resulting from

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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the acts of the incompetent servant,
whether the master's knowledge of the
servant's incompetency was actual, or
direct, or constructive; the master is
chargeable with knowledge of the incompetency of the servant if by the exercise
of due or reasonable care or diligence he
could have ascertained such incompetence.
The allegations of Walker Bank fit neatly into the staternent of the law above.
This Court has supported the above rule in Stone v.
Hurst Lumber Company, 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910 (Utah 1963).
There the Court accepted as proper the contention that an
employer may be liable for being "negligent in failing to
exercise reasonable care for the safety of its customers by
employing or retaining a person whom it knew, or should have
known because of habits or temperament, might" injure another
dealing with that employee.

Id. at 911.

The courts have,

therefore, recognized that an individual in the wrong
position or employment may be a dangerous instrumentality
to third persons.

One ought not to be able to hire another

to do his bidding with known wrongful tendencies and propensities without bearing the consequences of the wrongs
committed when those tendencies and propensities effectuate
themselves in wrongful action.
As stated earlier herein, it is not material whether
or not the actions of the employee was within the scope
of employment where the action is based upon the negligence
of the employer in hiring and continuing to employ an
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-13Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

incompetent employee.

In Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard

Company, 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824

(1964), the Kansas

Supreme Court was faced with a law situation similar to
the one now before this Court.

In Stricklin the plaintiff

had alleged that the defendant employees "knew or had knowledge" that an employee had played dangerous pranks to
those properly on the premises of the defendant.

The

plaintiff in that case was the recipient of one of the
pranks and was injured.

In reversing the lower court which

had dismissed the action against the employer, the Kansas
Supreme Court wrote:
The doctrine of respondeat superior is
not here involved. This is a common law
action charging the master with actionable
negligence in retaining an incompetent and
unfit employee, and it is unnecessary to
determine whether Burt [the wrongdoing
employee] was acting within the scope of
his employment. Id. at 829
(bracketed
i tern added. )
In this matter now before this Court respondent requests a
similar reversal to that requested and granted in the
Stricklin case.
Appellant Walker Bank & Trust Company merely requests
permission of this Court to have the opportunity to prove
the substance of its allegations.

As has been shown by the

recitation of the authorities herein, if Walker Bank can
establish as true the facts as alleged, then Walker Bank
will be entitled to relief from respondents herein.
-14-
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POINT IV
APPELLANT HAS STATED A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON THE
ALLEGATIONS THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO
ADEQUATELY SUPERVISE AN EMPLOYEE WHOSE
ACTIONS MAY BE THE CAUSE OF DAMAGE TO
WALKER BANK.
Appellant Walker Bank & Trust Company also asserts
that the court below erred in failing to recognize that
the Third-Party Complaint stated a claim against respondents upon which relief may be granted based upon a claim
that respondents failed to adequately supervise the actions
of one of its employees, namely Elmer G. Erickson, should
appellant be required to respond in damages to plaintiff.
The allegations here also are that the respondents knew
or should have known of the mismanagement of Cache Valley
Syndicate Trust by Elmer G. Erickson, it being the actions
of Elmer G. Erickson which give rise to the action of
plaintiff against appellant for damages.

Here again we

refer to the Restatement, Second, Agency §213 to establish
the general rule.

That section provides:

A person conducting an activity through
servants or other agents is subject to
liability for harm resulting from his
conduct if he is negligent or reckless:

* * * *

(c)
in the supervision of the
activity; or
(d)
in permitting, or failing to
prevent, negligent or other torti~us conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents,upon premises or with instrumentalities under his control.
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The courts and authorities have recognized that the employer
must supervise his employees.

The dilatory and non-diligent

employer will not be rewarded for its ignorance of his employee's actions caused by its failure to supervise that
employee.

Such a result would have no social utility.

The

employer is properly charged with the knowledge of the actions
of his employees that proper supervision would have disclosed
and the duty to correct any wrongly performed actions or
take steps to assure that future wrongful acts are prevented.
Elmer G. Erickson was also placed or allowed to remain
in a position wherein the wrongs could have been committed
merely by virtue of the position held.

Elmer G. Erickson

was directly involved in the management of CVST which presumably gave him access to all the instrumentalities of
CVST, including the checks and accounts.

The Restatement,

Second, Agency, §219 provides:
(2)
A master is not subject to liability
for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:

* * * *

(d)
the servant purported to act or
speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation.
(Emphasis

Added)
Without such access the torts of Elmer G. Erickson alleged
by plaintiff below and appellant could not have occurred.
Appellant hereby requests this Court to recognize,
like the authors of the Restatement quoted above, that one.
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who undertakes an enterprise has a duty to others to do all
within his power to assure that the enterprise is operated
in a safe and non-damaging manner especially when that employee is placed or allowed to remain in a position which
could aid the commission of the tort.

This duty is inde-

pendent of any duty to hire competent employees.

Once

employed the employee should not be left to his own, subject
to all the monetary temptations to which even strong persons can succumb without some adequate precautions and
supervision.

The allegations of the Third-Party Complaint

suggest that respondents did fail to meet that supervisory
standard in their continued employment of Elmer G. Erickson.
It is to this allegation that appellant also requests an
opportunity to present the merits.
CONCLUSION
The allegations of the Third-Party Complaint of
Walker Bank & Trust Company, the appellant herein, state
claims against Golden Stettler, Lynn Toolson, Alma Dittmer,
H. M. Nielson and Elmer Gibson, the respondents herein,
based upon a respondeat superior theory, their negligence
in hiring and continuing to employ their wrongdoing employee,
and for the failure to supervise the actions of that wrongdoing employee.

If for some reason some technical aspect

of pleading has not been met causing the pleadings of the
Third-Party Complaint to be inadequate, we respectfully
-17-
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request that this Court remand this action to the trial
court so that an amended pleading may be submitted,
otherwise we respectfully suggest that the decision of the
lower court be reversed and the matter be remanded to the
trial court for further discovery and trial.

The granting

of the motion to dismiss of respondents was premature.
Appellant merely asks for an opportunity to prove that
which it pleaded, which if proved would state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under generally accepted
principles of law as noted herein.
Respectfully submitted this

-1!J!!... day

of May, 1978.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH

//~-/ . ~/~ // .-l,f

~! /L1,yi.~t·;1/---..I
Calvin L. Rarnpt9n

By\b~~'

/

D. Miles Holman
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 521-3200
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY
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W. Scott Barrett
BARRETT & MATHEWS
Attorneys for Respondents
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N. George Daines, III
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